A STUDY OF IMPLICATION IN ENGLISH

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Rarely do we realize into sounds or letters all the content that we wish to communicate to other people by means of language. In case of interpersonal conversation, such extralinguistic information as gestures or facial expressions of participants makes it unnecessary to do so. But is it the only thing that thus saves us time and labour?

How is it that a person who has no sister makes a puzzled look if a friend of his addresses to him, saying 'How's your sister'? It seems to me that the reason for this lies in the utterance itself rather than in the friend's gestures or expressions.

In the present paper, when a speaker implicitly includes some semantic content in his utterance, we will call his action 'implication,' and the content 'implicature.' Furthermore, implicature will be subdivided into two major classes; conversational implicature and presupposition. After considering the nature of these two classes of implicature separately, we will proceed to make several attempts to discern their interrelationship as far as possible.
CHAPTER II

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

If we want to achieve a certain goal by means of language, we must, needless to say, actually use language in a given context.

It is sometimes the case that a sentence, though structurally ambiguous, may permit only one interpretation. On the other hand, a sentence which is structurally unambiguous can be interpreted in more than one way.

Sentence \((C - 1)\), for example,

\[ (C - 1) \quad \text{I saw her duck.} \]

has two distinct readings; in one reading the word 'duck' is a verb, while in the other it is taken to be a noun. Suppose, however, that the sentence is preceded by another sentence 'Someone threw a stone at her.' Then, the only one possible interpretation of \((C - 1)\) is that in which the word 'duck' means (roughly) 'lower oneself.' If, on the other hand, this sentence is uttered by a person while talking with his friends about their pets, we cannot but choose to take 'duck' as 'a kind of swimming bird.'

Let us consider another example. Suppose now that I am standing helplessly by my immobilized car and a passer-by, Mr. A, comes near. And the following talk exchange takes place.

\[ (C - 2) \quad \text{I : 'I'm out of petrol.'} \]

\[ \text{Mr. A : 'That's too bad. There's a garage around the corner.'} \]"
Then I will probably be relieved to believe that I can get some petrol at the 'garage' Mr. A mentioned. But what makes me think so? Mr. A has said nothing to the effect that 'the garage' is now open and has petrol to sell.

Here let us have a look at the theory of conversation H. P. Grice proposes², with the idea of using it as a clue to the problem. We might, says Grice, formulate a rough general principle which each participant in conversation will be expected to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE.

Under this principle are set up a number of maxims, which fall into four categories; Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.

A. Quantity This category relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims.

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

B. Quality Supermaxim 'Try to make your contribution one that is true.'

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

C. Relation Be relevant.

D. Manner Supermaxim 'Be perspicuous.'

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

If we assume that conversation in general goes on according to the Cooperative Principle and its attendant maxims given above, the foregoing example concerning a stranded car might be explained as follows.

It seems reasonable to say that I decided, by saying, 'I'm out of petrol,' that the purpose of the talk exchange is to replenish the car with petrol and drive it off, and that the addressee, Mr. A, also accepted it. Then his statement 'There's a garage around the corner,' in view of (among others) the maxim of Relation, can be taken to imply that I can get some petrol there.

It was presumably the consequence of this inference that I felt relieved, though it was made too swiftly to be noticed. Let us now regard the content 'The garage is now open, and has petrol to sell' as a specimen of conversational implicature of the utterance 'There's a garage around the corner,' in the sense that the utterance implicitly conveyed the content in this particular context. It goes without saying that it is the Cooperative Principle and its attendant maxims introduced earlier that enable us to discern conversational implicature, if any, in a given utterance. Here arises a question; Should the four categories of maxims, the Cooperative Principle aside, be attached the same amount of weight in supporting conversational implicature? Is there not, in other words, any difference in importance between them?
With the hope of finding an answer to this question, let us consider the following example. Suppose the following talk exchange takes place between two employees, A and B, working for a company.

(C - 4) A: 'Where's the boss? I've got something important to tell him.'
B: 'He's either in the factory or in the council room.'

In this case it should be fairly clear that B is infringing the maxim of Quantity by giving less information than is required by A. However it seems likely that one does not think the exchange is unnatural or that B is to blame. This is probably because one can do justice to B as follows.

It might be that B does not know exactly whether the boss is in the factory or in the council room. If B said either 'He's in the factory' or 'He's in the council room,' he would be accused of infringing the maxim of Quality, namely, 'Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.' So he can be said to have chosen to observe the maxim of Quality at the expense of the maxim of Quantity.

If I am correct in inferring in this way, it can safely be said that B's utterance conversationally implicated 'I don't know exactly which place he is in,' by attaching more weight to the maxim of Quality than to that of Quantity. As the above consideration suggests, it is of great interest which category should be given the greatest importance, and which the second greatest importance, in short, what 'ranking' should
be determined among the four categories. But in this paper, I think, it suffices to say that the four categories do not seem to have the same amount of weight, or at least that in case of a clash between the maxim of Quality and that of Quantity, the former is observed in preference to the latter.

It is now time to consider the role which conversational implicature plays in everyday conversation. Assume that we human beings were totally unable to produce or understand conversational implicature, and we will surely notice that it plays a far more important part than expected. If we could not produce or understand conversational implicature as has been considered or, in other words, if there were no such thing as conversational implicature, there would arise a lot of difficulties that are so serious as to make communication itself impossible. Some of them will readily suggest themselves to us. That is, if we lost our ability to produce and understand conversational implicature, we would be forced to choose between two counterplans to the 'communication crisis'; one is that we actually utter all the semantic content, including of course the implicit content which used to be called 'conversational implicature,' that we do wish to communicate to other people, while the other is that we eliminate the whole implicit content, or to put it differently, that we utter only the explicit content. If we choose the former counterplan, conversation will inevitably suffer from unbearable complexity and prolixity. If, on the other hand, we choose the latter, conversation will have a great many 'gaps' in it: with so many gaps, as will be generally expected, conversation can no longer serve as a means of communication. From consideration of this sort, there can be no objection, it seems to me, to what I now wish to claim, namely, that conversational implicature
as has been considered so far serves as, so to speak, an unrealized utterance (opposed to those utterances which have undergone realization into sounds or letters) connecting like a chain two adjoining realized utterances. My further contention is that it is nothing other than the Cooperative Principle and its attendant maxims which enable conversational implicature to play its part. It is past all dispute that this particular function of conversational implicature has a great deal to do with the generally accepted tendency of human language to 'economize labour.' Besides, conversational implicature spices our conversation with irony, insinuation, and the like. They have resisted a thorough inquiry since early times. One reason for this might be that they are 'hidden' in the unrealized part of conversation, conversational implicature. Let us now consider an example of irony borrowed from Grice.

X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says 'X is a fine friend.'

In this case, it is perfectly obvious to the audience as well as to A himself that what A has said or has made as if to say is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that A knows that this is obvious to the audience. So, unless A's utterance is entirely pointless, A must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward.
This is (roughly) the way in which irony enters our consciousness. A can be said to have brought what he really wanted to say (perhaps that 'X is a beast of a friend,' or something like this) to his audience's consciousness, by infringing the first maxim of Quality ('Do not say what you believe to be false.') in an ostentatious fashion. What, however, if the audience consisted only of 'thick-skinned' people, or if the audience, contrary to A's expectation, did not know the fact that X betrayed A's trust? In either case, the intended irony cannot demonstrate itself. It might be said that in the former case the conversational implicature was blocked by the insensitivity on the part of A's audience, while in the latter by inappropriate context (in which it was impossible for the audience to notice the fact of A's acting against the first maxim of Quality). As is clear from the above argument, conversational implicature, if produced by a speaker at all, is not always perceived by his audience.

We are now in a position to give our own definition of conversational implicature.

If a speaker of natural language implicitly includes any semantic content C into his utterance U in a given context with the hope of producing a certain effect E in his audience, C is said to be the conversational implicature of U.

The underlined part reflects the fact that conversational implicature may or may not succeed in producing the effect intended by the speaker. The above example of irony counts as a specimen of those cases in which conversational implicature fails to produce the intended effect in the audience.
To balance the argument, it behoves us to take an example of successful conversational implicature. A gentleman A and his butler B come into a room all the windows of which are closed. The following talk exchange takes place.

(C - 5) A: 'It's too hot in here.'

B: 'Shall I open the windows, sir?'

This can rightly be said to be a clear case where the conversational implicature involved succeeded in producing the intended effect in the audience. That is, A's utterance conversationally implicated (roughly) 'I want you to relieve me of the discomfort caused by heat.' and B properly comprehended the conversational implicature and granted A's 'request' by offering to open the windows.

We might well characterize thick-skinned people as those who are somewhat poor at comprehending conversational implicature. Similarly, sensitive people can be looked on as those who are able to take in what someone else conversationally implicates, given an appropriate context.

Misunderstanding can also be accounted for in terms of conversational implicature. It seems to me that misunderstanding can in most cases be attributed to a misconception on the part of the hearer of the conversational implicature produced by the speaker. One should not, however, take this remark of mine to mean that the speaker is in no case responsible for misunderstanding. It is sometimes the case that the speaker gives rise to misunderstanding. I mean here those cases where the speaker produces conversational implicature 'inappropriately.' Such cases are not hard to think of. We have
already seen one such example without knowing it. Recall that A’s utterance ‘X is a fine friend’ cannot but fail to communicate the intended irony to the audience provided that the audience does not know X’s betrayal. In such a context, then, no one could reasonably blame the audience for mistaking A’s utterance in its ‘literal’ meaning. It is not the audience but A himself (or, more specifically, the ill-produced conversational implicature) that is responsible for this misunderstanding.

We find in daily conversation a lot of cases where a realized utterance (at least superficially) in the form of a question can be said to conversationally implicate a ‘request.’ The following question, for instance,

\[(C-6)\] Will you close the door?

has at least one reading in which it is taken to mean roughly the same thing as \[(C-7)\].

\[(C-7)\] Please close the door.

In this case, it seems fair to say that \[(C-6)\] conversationally implicates \[(C-7)\]. If this judgment is correct, a very interesting question will immediately suggest itself to us, namely: Why does one choose the way of requesting by conversational implicature, as in \[(C-6)\], instead of making a direct request, as in \[(C-7)\]? In this connection, it may be helpful to make a survey of Rules of Politeness that Robin Lakoff informally proposed along with the claim that those indirect speech acts which are polite abide by these rules⁴.
(C - 8) 1. Don't impose.
2. Give options.
3. Make A feel good—be friendly.

Glosses for Rules 1 and 2 are given as follows:

Rule 1: Don't impose. This can also be taken as meaning, Remain aloof, don't intrude into 'other people's business.' If something, linguistically or otherwise, is nonfree goods, in Goffman's sense, this rule cautions us to steer clear of it, or in any event to ask permission before indulging in it. So we request permission to examine someone else's possessions; and similarly, if we are about to ask a question that is personal, we must normally ask permission before we do it:

(12) May I ask how much you paid for that vase, Mr. Hoving? But not, in a case where the reply is not construable as nonfree goods:

(13) * May I ask how much is 1 + 1?
(Unless something deeper is implicit in the questioning.)
(Of course, the request for permission is more or less conventional, since you are asking the question at the very moment you are asking permission to ask it; but it's the thought that counts. You appear to give the addressee an out (see Rule 2), even though actually you don't.)

Rule 2 operates sometimes along with R 1, sometimes 'Let A make his own decisions--leave his options open for him.' This may seem the same as remaining aloof, but actually it only sometimes is. So certain particles may be used to give the addressee an option about how he is to react:

At first sight, her analysis seems highly plausible. But we should be careful not to gulp down the whole story, with it in mind that most utterances with conversational implicature must tell the audience that they go against one or more of the conversational maxims, thereby
making the audience get on the track of working out the conversational implicature involved.

It should be clear, in view of the supermaxim of Manner (‘Be perspicuous.’), that when a speaker says p and conveys q, his saying p obviously discords with the supermaxim, since in order to fulfill his intention it would be more ‘perspicuous’ to say q directly.

Let us now consider those cases where one makes an indirect request by saying, ‘Can you • • •?’ If somebody wants to ask somebody else to do something, it is a prerequisite that the addressee can do Q. (If the speaker knows or believes that the addressee is unable to do Q, there is no reason for the speaker to ask the addressee whether he could do Q or not.) Then the speaker can make a request by means of a question. His saying p, thus, can be said to have the ‘effect’ of both question and request. It follows from this that he did ‘take a short cut.’ The speaker was, in this sense, observing the third maxim of Manner, namely ‘Be brief.’ But probably one cannot help wondering here whether or not this is the sole factor that made him resort to such an indirect way of requesting. Assuming that, in order to fulfill the purpose of being brief, he could have said ‘You can • • •’ instead of ‘Can you • • •,’ we could claim that some other factor (presumably, ‘politeness’) is involved in this case. Next let us consider the difference between the following two sentences, with the hope that this will do much for further characterization of conversational implicature.

(C - 9) You can help me to move this table.
(C - 10) Can you help me to move this table?
There will be no objection to my judgment that \((C-10)\) is more polite than \((C-9)\) as far as both of them are taken as requesting. What kind of conversational implicature, then, could be thought of other than request? We will formulate, after Gordon & Lakoff's fashion, this implicature of politeness as \((C-11)\) for \((C-9)\), and as \((C-12)\) for \((C-10)\).

\[
\begin{align*}
(C-11) & \quad \text{SAY} \ (a, \ b, \ \text{CAN} \ (b, \ Q))^* \\
& \quad \rightarrow \text{ASSUME} \ (a, \ \text{ACCEPT} \ (b, \ Q)) \\
(C-12) & \quad \text{ASK} \ (a, \ b, \ \text{CAN} \ (b, \ Q))^* \\
& \quad \rightarrow \text{ASSUME} \ (a, \ \text{POSSIBLE} \ (\neg \text{ACCEPT} \ (b, \ Q)))
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, if \(a\) says to \(b\) that \(b\) can do \(Q\), then \(a\) assumes that \(b\) will accept to do \(Q\) and if \(a\) asks of \(b\) whether or not \(b\) can do \(Q\), then \(a\) assumes that it is possible for \(b\) not to accept to do \(Q\).

Since in \((C-11)\) \(a\) does not assume that \(b\) may or may not accept to do \(Q\), the conversational implicature conveyed by \((C-11)\) clearly infringes Rule of Politeness 1 ('Don't impose'). In \((C-12)\), on the other hand, \(a\) in fact allows for a case where \(b\) refuses to do \(Q\), and the conversational implicature conveyed by \((C-12)\) can be said to abide by Rule 2 ('Give options'). Thus if we are to be justified in formulating the conversational implicature as in \((C-11)\) and \((C-12)\), the above discussion may serve as a possible (though partial) account for the reason why we have a general tendency to refrain from requesting directly.
CHAPTER III

PRESUPPOSITION

One might be a little surprised when one is reminded that the term 'presupposition' is not originally a term invented to be employed in linguistic research. The fact is that it has long been used by philosophers to explain the semantic properties of words. It was only recently that C. J. Fillmore, among others, 'borrowed' it from the discipline of philosophy and applied it to linguistics in a new scope. This newly introduced term, it might be said, made it possible to widen the narrow scope and limitation of linguistics by evaluating language in connection with reality. The narrowness of the scope of linguistics in those days can, according to Otto Jespersen⁸, be attributed to its neglect (not its inability) to deal with the problem of evaluation, namely, the problem of meaning. It should be noted here that it would be wrong to suppose that meaning is an entity independent of words, though Fillmore urges that it is the property of reality. Meaning always goes with words or sentences in their practical use. The truth of this can easily be recognized if we recall the fact that reality can in no way come into our perception unless it is expressed in words or, more commonly, in sentences. Indeed, we should carefully avoid widening the 'gaping' gap between words and reality in thus emphasizing the importance of reality alone; and yet it is also an undeniable fact that we can hardly know reality without language.

Even a cursory survey of several papers on presupposition is enough to convince us that the notion and use of presupposition is very
different from linguist to linguist, and that it seems a hard task to lump all these various definitions into one and the same notion. The diversity of presupposition might, however, be reducible to the multiplicity of the sort and range of the variables $x$ and $y$ in the familiar presuppositional formula '$x$ presupposes $y$.' In this chapter, we will regard presupposition as a kind of condition which guarantees an appropriate use and understanding of a given linguistic form, more specifically, a given sentence, and give it the following rough definition.

If a proposition $P$ must be true in order for a sentence $S$ to be meaningful, $P$ is said to be a presupposition of $S$.

For example, the (a)-sentences in the following pairs presuppose the corresponding (b)-sentences in the sense defined just above.

(P-1) (a) The girl Bob married was a blonde.
    (b) Bob married a girl.

(P-2) (a) What surprised John was her eccentric conduct.
    (b) Something surprised John.

(P-3) (a) It was my uncle who saved the drowning boy.
    (b) Someone saved the drowning boy.

It is obvious that if the (b)-sentences are false, the corresponding (a)-sentences must be meaningless or invalid.

It should be pointed out, at this stage of argument, that 'S' in the above definition need not be an affirmative sentence. In fact, any kind of sentence may have a presupposition.
The dandelion you have in your hair is very pretty.  
(Affirmative)

(b) The dandelion you have in your hair is not very pretty.  
(Negative)

(c) Where did you pick the dandelion you have in your hair?  
(Interrogative)

(d) Give me the dandelion you have in your hair.  
(Imperative)

(e) What a pretty dandelion you have in your hair!  
(Exclamatory)

The sentences (a) through (e) presuppose 'You have a dandelion in your hair.'

The examples considered so far may lead one to the idea that presupposition is contained in what traditional grammarians call a clause. The fact is, however, that there are a lot of cases where presupposition is carried by a grammatical unit smaller than clause. Take the following sentences for example.

(P - 5) (a) I have lived here for ten years.

(b)* Beethoven has lived here for ten years.

(c)* Mozart has lived here for ten years.

Considering for some time the reason why (b) and (c), but not (a), are attached an asterisk, one will probably arrive at a conclusion to the effect that if the main verb of a sentence is in present perfect and if the subject denotes a human being, then the person referred to by the subject must be alive just now. Assuming that this is correct, (b) can
be said to presuppose 'Beethoven is alive,' which is obviously false. It seems reasonable to say that the semantic anomaly of (b) is due to the falsity of the presupposition of (b), namely, 'Beethoven is alive.' Further examples are given just below.

(P − 6 ) (a) His children are all diligent.
   (b) He has children.

(P − 7 ) (a) She is very beautiful in her pink dress.
   (b) She has a pink dress.

(P − 8 ) (a) I will lend you my camera.
   (b) I have a camera.

(P − 9 ) (a) The President of the United States will go over to England.
   (b) There is a president of the United States.

In each case, (a) is said to presuppose (b). These pairs seem to suggest that what is called a definite noun phrase may carry a presupposition that there exists what is referred to by the NP.

It is widely known that a certain class of verbs (factive verbs, as they are usually called) presuppose the truth of their complement sentences.

(P − 10) (a) He regrets that she is ill.
   (b) She is ill.

(P − 11) (a) I forgot that the store is closed today.
   (b) The store is closed today.

However, such verbs are by no means the only words that are capable
of carrying presuppositions. Consider for instance the following pairs of sentences.

\[(P - 12)\] (a) It ate the fish.
(b) It is an animal.

\[(P - 13)\] (a) My cousin is pregnant.
(b) My cousin is female.

In each case, if (b) is not true, (a) will be said to be a nonsensical sentence. That is, (a) presupposes (b). Judging from \((P - 12)\), the verb 'ate' could be said to presuppose that the subject of the sentence in which it occurs has the semantic feature [+Animal]. Similarly, the adjective 'pregnant' could be said to presuppose that the subject has the feature [+Female] (or [−Male]). Now let us assume without discussion that what is called a selectional restriction can be looked on as a special kind of presupposition which is carried by a single word. As will be shown below, any violation of selectional restrictions results in a nonsensical, or semantically anomalous, sentence.

\[(P - 14)\] *My father is buxom.
\[(P - 15)\] *The pencil drinks much beer.
\[(P - 16)\] *Sincerity fell from the table.

The words 'father,' 'pencil,' and 'sincerity' violate the presuppositions carried by 'buxom,' 'drinks,' and 'fell,' respectively. The trouble here is that not all sentences in which selectional restrictions are violated are nonsensical. There are, in fact, many such sentences which are far from senseless. These are the cases in which we resort to
 analogical, metaphorical, or symbolic expressions. When we do wish to express things which are unique in their property and quality, we cannot help deviating from the conventional selectional restrictions. It might be no exaggeration to say that we are ready to disregard them in such cases. Here are some such examples.

(P-17) Napoleon was a wolf.
(P-18) Man is a thinking reed.
(P-19) The sky wept.

While these are clear cases of violation of selectional restrictions, no one will call them senseless. In fact, they seem to represent reality more vividly than otherwise. Taking into consideration the fact that all the sentences (P-14) through (P-19) contain the violation of selectional restrictions, it is quite natural to wonder here why (P-14) - (P-16), and not (P-17) - (P-19), are called 'nonsensical.' Our attention will be paid exclusively to this particular problem for some time.

Let us, for the time being, confine our attention to the sentence (P-19), which is repeated below, for convenience' sake.

(P-19) The sky wept.

When we come across this sentence, our first impression will be 'It strikes me as strange.' This is partly because 'the sky' is violating the selectional restriction of 'wept.' We human beings are, however, inclined to try hard to make sense of a given sentence even in case it seems nonsensical at first sight. This inclination may rightly be
explained by the incontrovertible principle of semantics that the human mind abhors a vacuum of sense*. So, when faced with seemingly absurd sentences, any speaker-hearer of natural language will strain his interpretative faculty to the utmost in order to read them meaningfully. But, to be concrete, how can we make sense of the sentence in question? The verb ‘persuade,’ for example, has not only the selectional restriction [+ [Human]—] but also many others. Let us now assume that it is possible to represent the meaning of a word as a ‘bundle’ of selectional restrictions. According to this assumption, the meaning of ‘persuade’ will be represented roughly as follows.

\[
(P - 20) \text{ persuade } \begin{cases} + [+] \text{Human} \\ + \text{Verbal action} \\ + \text{Causing} \\ + \text{Appealing} \\ + \text{Urging} \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{cases}
\]

Similarly, the meaning of the verb ‘weep’ can be represented as the following bundle of selectional restrictions.

\[
(P - 21) \text{ weep } \begin{cases} + [+] \text{Human} \\ + \text{Express grief} \\ + \text{Shed tears} \\ + \text{Let fall drops of water} \\ + \text{Exude liquid} \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{cases}
\]
In arranging selectional restrictions from top to bottom, it is recommendable to observe the principle 'The more essential the feature is to the action denoted, the higher it should be placed.' (It is, of course, no surprise that the order determined should be different from person to person. This might be said to reflect the fact that many people give various interpretations to one and the same metaphorical expression.) The next thing to do is erase the features [+Human], [+Express grief], and [+Shed tears], which are incompatible with the subject 'the sky.' Finally we will choose the highest feature remaining (in this case, [+Let fall drops of water]) as the 'representative' of the non-metaphorical part of the meaning of the verb 'weep.' As a result, we will get \((P-22)\) or, alternatively, \((P-23)\).

\begin{align*}
(P-22) & \quad \text{The sky let fall drops of water.} \\
(P-23) & \quad \text{It rained.}
\end{align*}

The bald sentence \((P-23)\) is the 'scum' which remains even after the meaning of \((P-19)\) is deprived of its metaphorical force.

Of course we should not flatter ourselves that what we have done amounts to the understanding of the metaphor expressed by \((P-19)\). Suppose now that the sentence was taken from a dirge in which the poet laments the sudden death of his bosom friend. Given such a context, we will have little difficulty in appreciating the metaphor we are now faced with. The context seems to entitle us to identify the sky with the poet's eye, and the raindrops with his tears. The upshot is that the rain symbolizes his sorrow. Let us consider another example of the same kind.
(P–24) Her brother is an ape.

If we arrange and erase the selectional restrictions of the noun 'ape,' we will probably be left with the features [+Mocking actions], [+Foolish], and so forth. Thus, we can easily grasp the cognitive meaning of (P–24).

(P–25) Her brother is imitative.
(P–26) Her brother is a fool.

(P–24) might be numbered among the so-called 'dead metaphors.'

Returning to the sentences (P–14) — (P–16), we will find it extremely difficult (or practically impossible) to apply the precedent procedure to them. The consideration of these sentences and many others may lead one to argue that a fairly sharp distinction can be made, in terms of this sort of analysis, between the sentences (P–14) — (P–16), on the one hand, and the sentences (P–17) — (P–19), on the other. That is to say, we can easily classify into two large groups those sentences in which some selectional restrictions are violated. For convenience' sake, such a sentence will henceforth be called an 'SSRV.' All SSRV's can be reduced to two classes on the basis of the extent to which they are susceptible to this procedure of analysis.

(1) An SSRV will be labelled 'sensesess' if it is very difficult (or, more exactly, so difficult as to baffle our strenuous effort to make sense of the sentence) to analyze it according to the procedure in hand.
(2) An SSRV will be labelled 'metaphorical' if it is relatively easy to follow the procedure in analyzing it.

A dead metaphor might be viewed as an extreme case of (2).

I hope enough has been said to claim that a certain class of sentences (metaphorical sentences such as \((P-19)\)) have 'double references'; one is a reference to an object of sensible intuition, while the other is to some unobservable property given by the intuition. We spare no effort to find some property that the subjects and the predicates of such metaphorical sentences do have in common. The double references characteristic of metaphorical sentences are not to be expected of selectional restrictions, since selectional restrictions, in most cases, combine only one semantic feature of a word and only one of another word. It is true that metaphorical sentences should be accused of violating some selectional restrictions, but they can never be identified with such nonsensical sentences as \((P-14)\) through \((P-16)\). It might be said that metaphorical sentences contribute to the development of the potential of human language by violating selectional restrictions.

CHAPTER IV

INTERRELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE AND PRESUPPOSITION

Our aim in this chapter is, as was announced in Chapter I, to consider the ways in which the two types of implication (i.e.,
conversational implicature and presupposition) are related to each other.

So far we have treated them, for the sake of simplicity, as two separate classes of the supercategory 'implication.' There are, however, a great many facts which force us to modify such an idea. That is to say, there is quite a little evidence against the claim that they can justly be viewed as two exclusive subcategories of implication. From now on, we will be concerned with some similarities and differences between conversational implicature and presupposition, hoping that they will shed light on something of the nature of the interrelationship. It well deserves special emphasis here that there is no need for us to abandon the fundamental view that they are the same in that they both include some implicit informativn into utterances.

Presupposition can be seen as a semantic entity which is, as it were, 'complete' within a single utterance. Conversational implicature is, on the other hand, a pragmatic entity which always needs to be assigned a certain context in order to fulfill its function. Schematically, this difference might be represented roughly as follows.

Figure 1

\[ \text{Context} \]
\[ \text{Utterance} \downarrow \]
\[ \text{Conversational Implicature} \]
\[ \text{Utterance} \downarrow \]
\[ \text{Presupposition} \]

But it seems impetuous to conclude at this point that they are two
different things. Let us next consider so-called 'happiness conditions.' A happiness condition is construable as a kind of situational condition on sentences. For example, in order for the sentence (1) to be uttered meaningfully, all the happiness conditions in (2) must be satisfied.

(1) Please open the door.

(2) (a) The speaker is in such a relation to the hearer as to make the polite request.

(b) The hearer is in a position to open the door.

(c) The speaker can assume the hearer to identify the door which he mentions.

(d) The door is closed.

(e) The speaker wants the door to be opened.

We might well say that (1) presupposes (a)—(e) in the sense defined in the preceding chapter. The correctness of this judgment can readily be acknowledged if we imagine a context in which one or more of the happiness conditions in (2) are not satisfied. If (c), for example, is not satisfied, that is, if the addressee B cannot identify the door the speaker A mentioned, B will normally ask of A which door A mentioned. In such contexts, of course, the request (1) cannot be expected to produce the desired result (B's opening the door).

There 'pragmatic' conditions (as opposed to linguistic or logical conditions) appear to be similar to what we usually refer to as 'physical contexts' which are independent of language. It seems to me, however, that these conditions can fulfill their function only when they come into our perception, which is inseparable from language. To put it another way, these conditions are related to linguistic forms; they are not so much concerned with extralinguistic performance as with linguistic competence. Thus these happiness
conditions; presupposed implicitly in the utterance, might be regarded as part of the sentence.

It seems justifiable to consider each ‘presupposition’ in (2) to be a ‘context’ in the widest sense of the term. But this context seems to be different, in a crucial respect, from that kind of context which was considered in relation to conversational implicature. Probably the difference is that the former is an ‘utterance-dependent’ context (in the sense that it always goes with a certain utterance), while the latter an ‘utterance-independent’ context (in the sense that it does not always need an utterance). In view of this difference, Figure 1 may now be modified into Figure 2.

Figure 2

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Context
Utterance
↓
Conversational Implicature

Utterance
Context
Presupposition
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It is now time to turn to our main concern in this chapter, namely, the interrelationship between conversational implicature and presupposition. Let us re-consider, as a possible clue to this ‘mystery,’ SSRV's as were discussed in the last few pages of the preceding chapter.

We have already seen that we normally try to make sense of sentences, even if they appear to be nonsensical. It was also pointed out that it is the abhorrence we have of a vacuum of sense which forces us to do so. Here I would like to emphasize that if we did
not have such an abhorrence, there could not be such literary devices as metaphor or allegory. Any SSRV would be rejected as senseless at once. This abhorrence seems to be explicable by Grice's conversational maxims. One possible explanation is this:

We take it for granted that anyone who utters a sentence does wish to communicate something to his audience, and that he is a 'cooperative' participant in the conversation. Probably it is because of this idée fixe that we abhor nonsensical-looking sentences. But the abhorrence does not 'permit' us to give up such sentences. It 'encourages' us to continue our attempts to make sense of them, saying all the while 'There must be some good reason for the speaker to appear to be infringing the Cooperative Principle.'

If this explanation is fundamentally correct, we may argue that some SSRV's (such as metaphorical ones) are saved from being rejected as nonsensical by the Cooperative Principle, which supports conversational implicature, but the other SSRV's such as \( P - 14 \) are expunged as beyond all hope of rescue. Thus the interrelationship in question would be represented roughly as follows:

Figure 3
Normal utterances which are free from presupposition-failure (as it might be called) such as violation of selectional restriction are capable of possessing conversational implicature within the outer context as well as presupposition within the inner context. A certain class of abnormal utterances (metaphorical SSRV's) can have conversational implicature within the outer context, even though (part of) the inner context is cancelled by the presupposition-failure. However, incorrigible SSRV's, which have neither conversational implicature nor presupposition, are disqualified for (say) English and struck out at once.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It is beyond the shadow of a doubt that the linguistic phenomena of implication are not to be handled properly in terms of grammaticality. We thus employed the notion of context in a number of ways in order to characterize these intriguing phenomena. Any grammar that can render a satisfactory account of why and how natural language presents
such phenomena would have to be organized in such a way that it meets the conditions which serve as a partial description of linguistic competence, the central notion in linguistics.

The meaning of words, unlike the mere significance of things or signs, includes within it various kinds of contexts as well as the things expressed or meant by them. Among these contexts are our beliefs and assumptions about the nature of the world, various universes of discourse, and so on, all of which are, in a sense, 'implied' in our utterances. Moreover, things meant depend largely on conversational implicature and presupposition. It should be clear from what we have seen that this notion of presupposition assumes great significance when we try to understand abstract, ambiguous, or elliptical expressions in literature. Utterances in ordinary language are, however, also abstract, ambiguous, or elliptical; their meanings or particular references must be determined (at least in part) by their presupposition. Our knowledge that there may be something implicit in a given utterance is essential to any successful understanding of the utterance. No doubt the implicit information must be shared by the speaker and the addressee, if it is possible at all to understand the utterance involved.

NOTES

1 This example is borrowed (with a slight modification) from H. P. Grice "Logic and Conversation."

2 *ibid.*

3 This should be understood as referring to that semantic content
which contains no conversational implicature.

4 Grice, *op. cit.*

5 Robin Lakoff, "The Logic of Politeness; or, Minding Your p's and q's." pp. 292-305.

6 It is true that the linguistic form ‘You can • • •’ is capable of conveying request, given some appropriate context; and yet we will leave open the problem of why this is so, since it seems to have no direct relevance to our main concern here.


10 The asterisk should hereafter be taken to mean semantic anomaly rather than ungrammaticality.


12 This is the abbreviation for a sentence with some selectional restrictions violated.

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