SOME REFLECTIONS UPON METAPHOR

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0.　INTRODUCTION

Like many other languages. the English language is filled with metaphorical expressions. The way they are used reflects how speakers of English perceive the outside world and how their conceptual system is organized.

Ever since Aristotle defined metaphor as an implicit comparison based on the principle of analogy, metaphor has, to a greater or less extent, interested scholars in various disciplines, such as literature, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, psychology, to name but a few.　Linguists' primary interest has been in the relationship between the extralinguistic pragmatic features of language and the intralinguistic semantic features of language.　By observing how metaphors (and metonymies) are used, anthropologists try to investigate the informants' views on such subjects as marriages, rituals, and cosmology.

The purpose of the present paper is to take a bird's-eye view of several problems centering upon metaphor and to see how pervasive metaphor (in its broadest sense) actually is in our everyday life.

1.　Metaphor and compositionality

Bierwisch (1970) stated two of the most essential assumptions of the semantic analysis of natural languages as follows:

(i)　the meaning of a given sentence can be accounted for on the basis of the

words or, more precisely, the dictionary entries of which it consists, and the syntactic relations connecting these items;

(ii) the meanings of dictionary entries are not unanalyzable wholes, but can be decomposed into elementary semantic components.

(Bierwisch 1970:27)

These two assumptions are, of course, closely related to each other. The internal organization of the meanings of dictionary entries must be of a form which determines how they enter the composite meaning of more complex constituents according to the syntactic relations within these constituents. The syntactic relations in turn must be specified in such a way that the correct combination of the meanings of related constituents can be determined.

The reason these two assumptions are crucial to the semantic analysis of natural languages can be easily seen if one is reminded of what Chomsky emphasized in his *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*: each human language in made up of an infinite set of sentences. The goal of linguistic theory is, then, to characterize the various properties, syntactic, semantic, or phonological, of all grammatical sentences of the given language. Chomsky tried to attain this goal by describing a finite set of rules which generate an infinite set of sentences.

The semantics of natural languages must be able to give an interpretation to an infinite set of sentences. It is, however, impossible to describe an infinite set of rules of semantic interpretation. This is exactly where the two assumptions count for much. Semanticists can do what they are expected to do indirectly in a compositional manner, i.e., by assigning meanings to lexemes, which together compose the meaning of the whole sentence.

Compositionality works fairly well if the sentence to be interpreted is a normal one whose semantic interpretation can be determined by the literal meanings of the constituent lexemes. It does not seem to work, however, if the sentence to be interpreted is a metaphorical one. Take, for instance, the following sentences:

(1) The proposal to build a nuclear power plant created a lot of controversy.

(2) I apologized many times to my father. trying to soothe his feelings.

(3) The beauty of the sunset was beyond description.

(4) The Earth . . . shall dream a dream crept from the sunless pole

(Robert Bridges "November")

(5) Whispering lunar incantations dissolve the floors of memory

(T. S. Eliot "Rhapsody on a Windy Night")

(6) She . . . plunged at Bourton into the open air

(Virginia Woolf *Mrs. Dalloway*)

Sentences (1)−(3) raise no question. Because they are free from any semantic anomaly, each of them can receive a semantic interpretation in accord with the principle of compositionality.

However, sentences (4)−(6), taken from literary passages, cannot be interpreted literally. How, then, should they be interpreted?

Predication analysis and role structure analysis[1] enable us to state fairly accurately where the anomaly lies in each case. For instance, in (4), *the Earth* plays the roles of Agent and Experiencer of *dream*, roles that call for an animate noun. In (5), *memory* is predicated as having floors, something that would require that memory be concrete, which it is not.

Though all the expressions in (4)−(6) contain semantic anomalies, they do not fail to communicate. This is probably because, when our knowledge of language and the world will not let us take a meaning literally, we do not give up, but rather try to "make sense" of the anomalies by allowing certain features to override others in the particular context. Thus, we allow the roles associated with *dream* to override the inanimacy normally associated with *the Earth*. Now let us look at (6), in which a person *plunges into air*. When Goal is specified for *plunge into*, then a liquid or at least something that resists is assumed. But air is not a liquid medium. One possible way of describing the effect of this metaphor is to say that by virtue of combination with *plunge*, the concept of liquidness is "projected" onto

air. As evidence showing that this is so, the same projection is repeated a few lines farther down in the passage of ***Mrs. Dalloway***[2], in the simile *the air . . . like the flap of a wave*, where *wave* again projects liquidness onto *air.* A second simile, [*like*] *the kiss of a wave*, multiplies the associations. The metaphor of a kissing wave involves projection onto wave of the features of physical discreteness, animacy (probably humanness), and even capacity for experiencing feelings. Thus, the air at Bourton is liquid, and at the same time animate and full of affection for the young Mrs. Dalloway — like a womb.

Quite often these semantic projections from one expression to another can create highly concentrated and unusual meanings, especially when abstract objects are treated as concrete ones. This common type of metaphor is a particular speciality of T. S. Eliot, as illustrated by (5) and:

(7) His soul stretched tight across the skies.

　　(T. S. Eliot "Preludes")

(7) presents a soul as a concrete, pliable object object that can be spread out like a blanket. The Path, *across the skies,* let us know that this object is also a very large one. At the same time, *soul* projects a religious meaning ("heavens") onto *the skies* here. According to this projection analysis, we say that in metaphors, anomaly — i. e. , semantic incompatibility — is in effect resolved through the projection of semantic characteristics between lexical items. Thus, the soul "becomes" concrete in order that it may be predicated as stretching across the skies, and the sky becomes spiritualized in order that it may accommodate the soul.

There is, however, one problem facing such an approach. The problem is: How should we specify which semantic characteristics of a particular item get projected and which do not ? For instance, the verb *trot* involves quick movement (faster than *walk* and slower than *run* or *gallop*) of a four-footed, normally equine animal. When this verb is used metaphorically of humans, as in *The boy trotted*

up with a note in his hand, what gets projected is the concept of quick movement. That is, we usually do not imagine the child approaching on all fours; only the Manner part of *trot* gets projected.

Another difficulty in the linguistic analysis of metaphor is the fact that the effectiveness of a metaphor often depends as much upon our knowledge of the actual world as upon our knowledge of language. For example, it is doubtful whether the semantic description of *kiss* would specify that kisses can be wet, but it is highly probable that our knowledge of this fact will "reinforce" the association between *kiss* and *wave* in the passage from *Mrs. Dalloway* discussed above. Our knowledge that one can plunge downward into liquids without incurring physical injury contributes to the comfort and security expressed by the heroine's plunging into the air, but again it is unlikely that these facts would be stated in the semantic description of the verb *plunge*. As a somewhat different example, the metaphorical effect of Eliot's line *His soul stretched tight across the skies* will be substantially heightened if its interpreter (i. e., the reader of the poem in hand) is familiar with another, much older metaphor, the traditional one in which our "nerves" are likened to strings that are sometimes stretched and sometimes loosened. Probably it is this long-standing metaphor that enables us to use such expressions as *tense, uptight, hang loose*, or *strung out* when referring to people. These expressions are now so mush a part of the English language that native speakers might not be aware of their metaphorical import. In a certain way, Eliot restored this "dead metaphor" (as it is commonly called) to life by using it in an unfamiliar way.

2. Metaphor and implication

It is not seldom that we "imply" by means of our utterances something other than what we actually say. Suppose, for instance, that you are requested to express your opinion about a person's character. You might say:

(8) He'd share his last crust of bread with you.

Obviously, you have not "said" of the person in question that he is both kind and generous. But you might reasonably be held to have "implied" this.

Much of the information that is conveyed from the speaker to the hearer in everyday conversation is implied, rather than asserted. There are, of course, some cases in which it is not clear whether the speaker intends the hearer to draw a particular inference or not. And this opens the way for misunderstanding and misrepresentation, on the one hand, and for the subtle manipulation of the hearer's opinion, on the other. However, in what one may think of as the standard kind of situation, not only does the hearer draw the inferences that the speaker intends him to draw, but they are such that the speaker himself, if asked, would also subscribe to them. I have assumed that this is so in respect of the above example. But this does not mean that it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the hearer would not draw the inference that the person referred to is kind and generous. Likewise, it will take only a little imagination to think of circumstances under which the speaker might insincerely and deceitfully intend the hearer to draw this inference.

About two decades ago, the notion of *implicature* was introduced into the philosophy of language, and subsequently into linguistics, to bridge some of the gap between the logical notions of implication and entailment, on the one hand, and the broader everyday notion of implication, on the other. According to Grice (1975), there are two kinds of implicatures: conventional and conversational. The difference between them is that the former type of implicature depends upon something other than what is truth-conditional in the conventional use, or meaning, of particular forms and expressions, whereas the latter derives from a set of more general principles which regulate the proper conduct of the participants in a conversation.

It has been argued, for example, that the difference between *but* and *and* in English can be accounted for in terms of the notion of conventional implicature.

Those who endorse this view, including Grice himself, would say that the following two sentences have the same propositional content:

(9A) She is poor *and* she is honest.

(9B) She is poor *but* she is honest.

If they also identify sentence-meaning with propositional content, they would say that the two sentences have the same meaning. I am confident that their assertion will meet with strong opposition by those on the outside of this discipline. The proponents of truth-conditional semantics can meet this challenge — if they accept that there is such a thing as conventional implicature — by attributing the difference in meaning to the conventional implicature associated with *but*.   They can say that the use of *but*, in contrast with *and*, indicates that the speaker feels that there is some kind of contrast between the conjoined propositions.

For example, on the assumption that the two sentences are being used to make an assertion and "she" refers to the same person in each of the conjoined clauses, in saying (9B), the speaker might be *implicating* (though not *asserting*) that it is unusual for anyone to be both poor and honest. But would the implication, or implicature, be as determinate as this ? Out of context there is no way of knowing exactly which of several propositions the speaker is implicating. Suppose, for example, that the speaker is extremely prejudiced against women. He might be surprised, not that anyone should be both poor and honest, but that a woman should be. Indeed, the speaker might not be indicating his own surprise at all, but only his expectation that the hearer will be surprised. In fact, there is a whole range of further possibilities, most of which can be subsumed in a general sort of way under the notion of contrast. What requires particular notice here is that it is remarkably difficult, or practically impossible, to say exactly what is implicated by the use of *but* without considering in some detail the actual context of the utterance in question.

The only other example that Grice himself gives to illustrate his notion of

conversational implicature is the use of *therefore*. But this does not mean, in my view, that there is any reason to restrict this notion to connectives and particles.

There are many expressions that are descriptively synonymous (i. e. , have the same descriptive meaning), but differ in respect of their social and expressive meaning. Most, if not all, of this difference would seem to fall within the scope of Grice's definition of conversational implicature. So does much of the difference that is carried in particular contexts by the choice of one form of an expression, rather than another. Suppose, for example, that a person says:

(10A)   Jesus Christ tells us to love our neighbor.

or

(10B)   Jesus Christ has told us to love our neighbor.

rather than

(10C)   Jesus Christ told us to love our neighbor.

He can be held to have implicated that Christ's injunction or exhortation had, and still retains, a certain authority and validity. In fact, the choice of tense and mood is commonly associated with semantic and pragmatic differences of this kind. Thus we can see that a much broader range of resources than such forms as *but, and, therefore*, etc. can be used by speakers to implicate something over and above what they actually say.

Grice's conversational implicatures have aroused far more attention in linguistics than have his conventional implicatures. The basic idea is, he says, that language-behavior, most typically, is a form of purposive social interaction governed by *the Principle of Co-operation*. In essence, Grice argues that we expect people to behave rationally and co-operatively, and we therefore interpret their utterances as if they were being rational and co-operative.

Grice recognizes several kinds of co-operation. which he groups under the headings of *Quantity, Quality, Relation,* and *Manner*. Each of these comprises a set of one or more sub-principles, formulated by Grice as prescriptive maxims,

which participants normally obey, but may on occasions violate.

For example, the two maxims having to do with *Quantity* are:

(I)   Make your contribution as informative as is required.

(II) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

By appealing to these, we can account for the fact that, if X asks:

(11A)   Have you cleaned your room and done your assignments ?

and Y replies:

(11B)   I've cleaned my room,

Y may be held to have implied, in normal contexts, that he has not done his assignments yet.   This implication, or implicature, derives from his (presumably deliberate) failure to say *Yes* or its equivalent to the composite proposition that is put to him.   The simple proposition "I have cleaned my room" is less informative than "I have cleaned my room and I have done my assignments".   On the assumption that Y is being duly co-operative and is being sufficiently infomative,

X can reasonably infer that Y cannot truthfully assert "I have done my assignments".

Similarly, by appealing to the maxim:

(III) Be relevant.

(classified under the heading of *Relation*), we can impose an interpretation on the following exchange:

(12) X: The clock is ten minutes slow.

      Y: There was a power failure early this morning.

We assume that the propositional content of Y's statement bears some relation to that of X's, in particular that Y is, or might be, supplying an explanation for what

X asserts to be the case. Of course, our assumption that Y's utterance is relevant to X's in this way depends not only upon our background knowledge about electric clocks, but also upon the further assumption that Y shares this background knowledge and knows that the clock in question is, or might be, operated by electricity directly supplied from the mains. It is easy to see that such everyday exchanges as the above may depend for their coherence — for the property of connectedness by virtue of which we classify them readily enough as texts — upon a whole set of assumptions of this kind, specific to particular cultures, particular groups of people.

The Maxim of **Quality** concerns the truthfulness of the content. Under this maxim come the following two sub-maxims:

(IV) Do not say what you believe to be false.

(V) Do not say things for which you lack adequate evidence.

These sub-maxims aptly account for the fact that we have qualms about telling a lie or asserting something of which we are not certain.

The four sub-maxims having to do with **Manner** are:

(VI) Avoid obscurity.

(VII) Avoid ambiguity.

(VIII) Be brief.

(IX) Be orderly.

By complying with these maxims, says Grice, the speaker tries, in most cases, to provide the information that the hearer needs in a proper way.

Much of the interest aroused by Grice's work on conversational implicatures derives from its explanatory potential in respect of a variety of phenomena that are troublesome from the viewpoint of formal semantics. Grice's maxims of co-operative interaction are especially helpful when we interpret metaphors. Let us

take up the following sentence as an example:

(13) John is a tiger.

How do Grice's maxims of co-operative interaction help us interpret this sentence ? To state the conclusion first, what actually happens is not that they guide us in our search for one metaphorical interpretation rather than another, but that they "motivate" the search itself. Hearing or reading this sentence, the addressee will most likely "reason" as follows, saying to himself as it were:

> The speaker/writer cannot mean that literally. However, there seem to be no grounds for believing that he is being unco-operative. His utterance has the form of a statement. Therefore, he must be trying to tell me something, which presumably makes sense to us both (in the light of our beliefs and assumptions about the actual world, etc.). He must also believe (if he is being co-operative) that I can work out the non-literal meaning for myself — probably on the basis of the literal meaning. One contextually acceptable way of using language to convey something other than what is actually said is by means of metaphor. Let me see whether I can interpret the utterance meta-phorically.

What demands special attention here is the multiplicity of assumptions that go into Gricean explanations of metaphor. I would like now to make to make clear a few of the points that are implicit in the above account of the addressee's reasoning. First, his assumption, or inference, that the utterance cannot have a literal interpretation does not depend upon its being semantically anomalous or contradictory: all that is required is that the literal sense should be *contextually improbable*. Second, the entire process of the reasoning is subject to the Zconstraints imposed by participants' beliefs and assumptions (including their beliefs and assumptions about one another's beliefs and assumptions). Third, I

have included as a separate step the addressee's recognition of the contextual appropriateness of metaphor: in certain contexts metaphor is more frequently used than in others. Indeed, there may well be occasions, determined by the socio-cultural situation or literary genre, on which the use of metaphor is so common that the addressee can skip the earlier steps in the reasoning process outlined above, and start with the assumption that a statement is more likely to be meant metaphorically than literally.

It is true that Grice's notion of conversational implicature gives us no assistance at all when it comes to the problem of deciding upon one metaphorical interpretation of a particular utterance rather than another. But that is not its purpose. Grice's aim was to maintain, as strictly and as consistently as possible, the distinction between what is actually said and what is conveyed (over and above, or instead of, what is said) by the fact of saying it. This is exactly where lies the *raison d'être* of Grice's notion of conversational implicature.

3. Metaphor and lexicon

There are a class of compound lexemes which do not conform to the ordinary productive rules of the language system. What is involved, in this case, is the application of derivational principles which do not so much violate the syntactic rules of the language system as creatively extend or transcend them. Many such compounds can be accounted for under the term 'metaphor.' An example of a compound that is obviously based on metaphor is 'wet blanket.' in the sense in which it denotes a person who inhibits others in their enjoyment or enthusiasm; another is 'live wire.' Both of these are, up to a certain point, grammatically regular: "He is a very wet blanket." and "He is a very live wire." are perfectly acceptable utterances. But as compound lexemes they are not fully endocentric: 'wet blanket' and 'live wire' , unlike 'blanket' and 'wire' , belong to the subclass of animate nouns.

Metaphor is not of course restricted to the formation of compound lexemes.

Many simple lexemes can be used metaphorically and have, for that reason, acquired more or less institutionalized senses which need to be put into the lexicon. What is theoretically interesting about metaphor is that, although it is normally discussed under the rubric of stylistics, rather than semantics, it is by no means restricted to what is often thought of as the more poetic use of language. If a distinction is drawn between productivity (a design-feature of the language system) and creativity (the language-user's ability to extend the system by means of motivated, but unpredictable, principles of abstraction and comparison), we can draw a corresponding distinction, with respect to both the production and the interpretation of language-utterances, between rules and strategies.

The term 'lexicalization' is ambiguous or equivocal from this point of view . It may refer to what is formalized in generative grammar as lexical insertion: the selection from the lexicon of pre-existing lexemes according to their syntactic and semantic specification. This process is naturally accounted for in the linguist's model of the language system in terms of rules. But 'lexicalization' may also refer to the creation of new lexemes. We will employ the term in the latter sense.

We have assumed that lexicalization, in the sense of the creation of new lexemes, cannot be accounted for in terms of generative rules. This should not be taken to mean that it is not subject to the constraints imposed by particular language systems and perhaps also to more general constraints which govern all language systems. But if we are correct in assuming that the lexicalization of compounds by means of 'metaphorical extension' is a normal process in the everyday use of language and that it can only be accounted for in terms strategies, rather than rules, this casts doubt upon the validity of another important assumption: the assumption that all the lexemes of a language can, in principle, be listed in the lexicon. Conventional dictionaries do no more than list a subset of the compound lexemes that native speakers are likely to produce; and it is difficult to see whether lexicon, however it may be constructed,   could do more than this.

The question of metaphorical extension has been raised here in connection with compound lexemes because in this case it has obvious implications for the actual

listing of lexemes. Exactly the same problems arise, of course, when it comes to the metaphorical extension of the sense of a simple lexemes, which is no more predictable by rule than is the creation of a new compound lexemes by means of the same strategies. Examples are not hard to find. We casually use such words as *mouth, eye, head, foot*, and *leg* when referring to rivers, needles, persons in authority, mountains, and tables, respectively. In each instance we can discern some similarity in shape or function between the referents. These dead metaphors are, one might argue, now fully institutionalized in the lexicon of English, and therefore should be regarded as part of linguistic competence of native speakers of English. He may well be right at that. There arises a problem, however, when he is reminded of the undeniable fact that the use of the adjective "dead" presupposes that what is modified by it *was* alive sometime in the past. It is easy to imagine that, at some period or other, these metaphors were still considered to be living metaphors with full metaphorical force. The question which has to be answered, then, is: When did these metaphors "die" ? That is, when did they get incorporated into the lexicon of the English language ? To make matters still worse, some metaphors that are alive at present may, in the not too distant future, die and get incorporated into the lexicon.

Any attempt to formalize the semantic structure of language systems and to generate all and only the possible interpretations of sentences is based upon the assumption that, not only the number of lexemes in any language, but also the number of senses associated with each lexeme, is finite and, therefore, enumerable. Metaphor constitutes a very serious theoretical problem for any theory of semantics that is based upon such assumptions. To put it rather ironically, metaphor has always been, and still is, "a thorn in the flesh" to a certain circle of scholars.

4. Metaphor and indirect speech acts

As a matter of course, knowing a language means a great deal more than simply knowing how to produce sentences; it also means knowing how to use them. When people speak, they intend something. They speak in order to accomplish something in what may be called the "linguistic marketplace," the interactional situations in which language is used to explain, describe, criticize, amuse, deceive, make commitments, express opinions, get others to do things, and so on. From one point of view, sentences like *Answer the question* or *Why don't you join us* ? are "instruments" for producing action in others. From another point of view, the sentences themselves are "actions" performed by the speaker. To explain something is to do something verbally; to ask somebody a question is to request that he/she answer. All utterances can be thought of as goal-directed actions, or "speech acts" as they are commonly called. Some of the many different classes of speech acts include utterances whose goal is getting people to do things; contractual speech acts, such as promising, betting, agreeing on a plan; and describing, informing, and explaining, which, along with criticizing, judging, and evaluating, play an especially important role in educational settings where language is regarded as one of the essential "tools."

What deserves special attention is the fact that a great many speech acts are performed "indirectly." The form of one may imply another. Let us consider the following sentences:

(14A)   I want you to turn off the radio.

(14B)   Will you turn off the radio ?

(14C)   Can you turn off the radio ?

All of the above sentences could be used as directives, or, more exactly, could be used with the "force" of a directive, in this case a request that the radio be turned off. However, none of them has the exact surface form of a request, such as *Please turn off the radio*. Taken literally, (14A) is an assertion about the

speaker's attitudes and feelings; (14B) and (14C) are questions about the addressee's attitudes and abilities respectively. Yet in normal contexts all can, and usually do, function as requests, and speakers of English eaily recognize that they are being used as such.

The usual basis for distinguishing between a direct and an indirect speech act is contextual: It would seem that indirect speech acts occur only when the context is such that the act literally performed would be obviously inappropriate in some way or other. For example, *Can you turn off the radio ?* — (14C) above — taken literally as a question about the addressee's abilities is inappropriate if it is obvious that the addressee is capable of turning off the radio. In this context, where the possibility of (14C) being a direct speech act is eliminated by the addressee from consideration, the seeming question can be used to perform some other act, which, though different from the one literally performed, is associated with it in some way.

Metaphors are very much like indirect speech acts in some fairly obvious ways.First, the addressee is expected for a different meaning from the literal meaning. Second, just like indirect speech acts, metaphors, taken literally, violate at least one of Grice's maxims discussed in Section 2 (especially those under the heading of *Manner*). Third, metaphors seem to have an emotive effect that is analogous to the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts. In interpreting metaphors, the addressee is, as it were, encouraged to partake with the speaker/writer of the discovery of novel and eye-opening resemblances between two disparate-seeming entities.

Now let us consider some examples from Searle (1979), one of the scholars to whom we owe the notion of indirect speech acts:

(15) Sally is a block of ice.

(16) I am in a black mood.

(17) Mary is sweet.

According to Searle, in these metaphorical utterances the speaker says "S is P," but *means metaphorically* that "S is R." Here arise two questions: (i) How can the speaker do that ? (ii) How can the hearer interpret "S is P" as "S is R" ?

Searle's answer is this. The utterance of P calls to mind the meaning and, hence, truth conditions associated with R, in the special ways that metaphorical utterances have of calling other things to mind. How, then, does the hearer discover the similarity between P and R ? Given the fact that the speaker can, in most cases, "get across" metaphors, it is only natural for us to assume that there must be some, more or less fixed, procedure for doing that. Searle points out that, to grasp the intended meaning of a metaphorical utterance, the hearer must have three sets of one or more "strategies" : (a) a strategy for determining whether or not he has to seek a metaphorical interpretation of the utterance in question (b) a set of strategies for computing possible values of R. (c) a set of strategies for restricting the range of R' s and deciding which R' s are likely to be the ones the speaker is asserting about S. Hearing the utterances (15) — (17) above, the hearer finds the meaning of each sentence defective, if taken literally, and addresses himself, with considerable spirit, to searching for the metaphorical meaning the speaker intended. In order to find an alternative meaning, he examines salient, well-known and distinctive features of P one after another, invoking his factual knowledge of P, saying to himself as it were:

> What do I associate "a block of ice" with ? Coldness ? Hardness ? Solidness ? . . . How about semitransparency ? . . . No, this will be no good. . . .

The last thing to do is to select from among the few features left those which are most reasonably attributable to S. Thus the hearer arrives at the conclusion that (15) probably means (for example) "Sally is unemotional" or "Sally is cold-hearted" ; (16) means "I am angry and depressed" ; (17) means "Mary is kind, gentle, and pleasant."

The greatest advantages of Searle's analysis outlined above are:

(i) it provides, in his own words, a variety of principles for computing R, given P, that is, a variety of principles according to which the utterance of P can call to mind meaning R in ways that are peculiar to metaphor.

(ii) it throws into relief the striking resemblance which metaphors present to indirect speech acts. Metaphors as well as indirect speech acts can be interpreted in many different ways, depending upon the contexts in which they are uttered.

5. Concluding remarks

As I said at the very beginning of **Introduction,** the English language has, like many other languages (including of course Japanese), an abundance of metaphors. Some are dead, and others are alive. (There may well be even "dying" metaphors.) We might go so far as to say if we use language at all, we can hardly avoid uttering or hearing metaphors, whether we are aware of it or not.

Metaphors can appear in a variety of forms: in a word as in "an **arm** of the sea," in a phrase as in **"black sheep,"** and even in an entire sentence as in "X: What kind of mood did you find our boss in ? Y: **The lion roared.**" The number of metaphors in our everyday speech will increase dramatically if we choose, **a la** Lakoff (1993: 228−229), to regard as metaphors sentences like "The pennant is in the bag," "She landed a good job," and "Those are the fruits of his labor." in that trying to achieve a purpose is likened to hunting, fishing, and agriculture, respectively.

Metaphor has at least two facets. On the one hand, it is, in the words of Miiller (1968:351), "one of the most powerful engines in the construction of human speech, and without it we can hardly imagine how any language could have progressed beyond the simplest rudiments," whereas it has been, on the other, a perennial headache to not a few scholars as we have seen.

Heated controversy has raged around the question as to how metaphor is best treated in a linguistic theory. But now most linguists, if not all, seem to have agreed that it should be incorporated into the theory of language somehow or other, whether in formal semantics or in pragmatic theories. Since it is not the purpose of this paper to clarify my position on this issue, I will content myself to say that chances appear extremely remote that we can make a full-scale analysis of metaphor without recourse to a pragmatic theory.

NOTES

1 I have borrowed these approaches from what is commonly known as "case grammar", developed primarily by Charles Fillmore, because, in my view, they provide fruitful ways considering sentence structure and meaning, especially when the sentences to be analyzed are extracted from literary works. Predication analysis and role structure analysis have proven very useful when, for instance, we try to account for the relationship between the following three sentences:

(a) They broke the icon with an ax.

(b) An ax broke the icon.

(c) The icon broke.

To serve the convenience of those who are not very familiar with these analyses, I will explain briefly what is meant by the Roles that are most commonly used. The "Agent" function is that of the doer who is responsible for an action or event taking place. In sentences like *I hit the boy, I ran away, I laughed, I* is the Agent of the hitting, the running. and the laughing, respectively. "Instrument" is the function expressing the means by which something is done, most explicitly, the thing used to achieve some end. Most often the Instrument function is expressed by *with* + *NP* as in *Jack cracked the chestnut with a hammer, I drew the sketch with charcoal.* But this need not be the case. "Experiencer" is the role of the

animate being inwardly affected by an event or characterized by a state. "Source" is the place or direction form which something comes. Usually, the Source is a location as in *I walked home from the supermarket,* but it may also be an animate being as in *She bought some apples from the farmer.* The "Goal" is the direction to which something goes. In moving from one place to another, a "Path" (the route by which something goes) may be contextually assumed, or it may play a significant role. The "Patient" is the role of the being or thing that is affected by the action or event, or that is simply present in it.

2　To substantiate what I have to say about the analysis of (6), I would like to give below a rather lengthy quotation from the first page of *Mrs. Dalloway.* For I assume that it is tantalizing, or even senseless, to argue about a particular metaphor without due reference to its context. It is worth noting that the association of a liquid substance or, more specifically, water begins with "beach" in the fourth line.

> Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself.
>
> For Lucy had work cut out for her. The doors would be taken off the hinges; Rumpelmayer's men were coming. And then, thought Clarissa Dalloway, what a morning — fresh as if issued to children on a beach.
>
> What a lark! What a plunge ! For so it had always seemed to her, when, with a little squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open the French windows and plunged at Bourton into the open air. How fresh, how calm, stiller than this of course, the air was in the early morning; like the flap of a wave; the kiss of a wave; chill and sharp and yet (for a girl of eighteen as she then was) solemn, feeling as she did, standing there at the open window, that something awful was about to happen; looking at the flowers, at the trees with the smoke winding off them and the rooks rising, falling; standing and looking

until Peter Walsh said, "Musing among the vegetables ?" — was that it
? — "I prefer men to cauliflowers" — was that it ? He must have said
it at breakfast one morning when she had gone out on to the terrace —
Peter Walsh. . . .

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